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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5134
This paper models the global financial crisis as a 
combination of shocks to global housing markets and 
sharp increases in risk premia of firms, households and 
international investors in a global economic model. 
The model has six sectors of production and trade in 
15 major economies and regions. The paper shows that 
the shocks observed in financial markets can be used to 
generate the severe economic contraction in global trade 
This paper—a joint product of the International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network; and the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort to assess the trade 
policy responses to the global financial crisis. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at WMcKibbin@msgpl.com.au and abstoeckel@gmail.com.
and production experienced in 2009. In particular the 
distinction between the production and trade of durable 
and non durable goods plays a key role in explaining the 
much larger contraction in trade than GDP experienced 
by most economies. The paper explores the implications 
of the large increase in fiscal deficits and the implications 
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1. What this study is about 
The September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, a mid-size ‘Wall Street’ investment 
banker, sent a wave of fear around world financial markets. Banks virtually stopped 
lending to each other. The risk premium on interbank borrowing shot up to 5 per cent, 
whereas typically it was close to zero. Although authorities scrambled to inject liquidity 
into financial markets, the damage was done. The risk premium on corporate bonds shot 
up even more to over 6 per cent. Large CAPEX projects were shelved, the corporate 
sector virtually stopped borrowing, trade credit was hard to get and, with falling 
demand, particularly for investment goods and manufacturing durables like cars, trade 
volumes collapsed. 
The result is that the global financial crisis has seen the largest and sharpest drop in 
global economic activity of the modern era. In 2009, most major developed economies 
find themselves in a deep recession.  The fallout for global trade, both for volumes and 
the pattern of trade has been dramatic.  The OECD predicts world trade volumes could 
shrink by 13 percent in 2009 from 2008 levels.1  
The contraction in trade has several interrelated causes comprising both price and 
income effects as global financial flows readjust, real exchange rates realign, terms of 
trade change and domestic savings rise with a concomitant drop in domestic demand. 
That is, financial problems have had devastating real effects. Each of these effects 
reverberates around the world, some compounding and some offsetting each other. 
Governments have responded with an easing of monetary and fiscal policy that in turn 
have their own effects on activity and financial and trade flows. The downturn in 
activity is causing unemployment to rise sharply and, with it, a political response to 
protect domestic industries through various combinations of domestic subsidies and 
border protection. There is potential for protectionism to rise further. 
Both the causes of the crisis and the policy responses are reshaping the level and pattern 
of world trade. The objective of this study is to disentangle the various direct and 
indirect effects of the crisis on international trade and how events might unravel. To do 
this, a dynamic, intertemporal general equilibrium model that fully integrates the 
financial and real sectors of the economy is used to unravel and understand the 
mechanisms at work. The model incorporates wealth effects, expectations and financial 
markets for bonds, equities and foreign exchange as well as trade and financial flows. It 
is a suitable tool to analyse the impact of the crisis and policy responses on global trade 
and financial flows. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the main linkages and 
mechanisms by which the financial crisis affects trade is given. This is necessary on two 
counts: it sets up the modelling approach and it also serves as a basis for developing the 
                                                      
 
1 OECD 2009 
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_37431_42788172_1_1_1_1,00.html    3
 
shocks to be imposed on the model that represent the financial crisis. The main features 
of the G-Cubed model that is used in this analysis are described briefly as the model is 
documented in full elsewhere. 
In section 3, the simulations to represent the financial crisis are described and the 
justification for the size of the shocks chosen. It turns out six shocks are needed: three 
for the crisis itself and three for the subsequent policy responses which covers monetary 
and fiscal stimulus as well as the trade protectionism that has emerged. 
Results are then discussed in two separate parts to disentangle the various 
macroeconomic influences on world economies including trade. In section 4 the effects 
of the crisis on world economies without the fiscal policy responses, that is the first 
three simulations, are described. Then in section 5, the results from the three policy 
responses are described on their own to gauge their relative impacts. Finally, in section 
6, some of the main insights are highlighted and discussed.  
 
2. How the financial crisis has affected trade outcomes 
The mechanisms at work 
The financial crisis has affected trade outcomes through several channels, some 
obvious, some less so. One obvious one is the slowdown in demand both by business 
and households. As households spend less so imports will fall, and hence someone 
else’s exports will fall. But other effects are more complicated as set out in chart 2.1. 
A financial crisis causes a sharp reappraisal of risk by households and business. With 
any loss of confidence, banks are no longer happy to lend at the same rates as before, if 
they lend at all. Trade credit under these circumstances is harder to come by. Such 
upward reappraisals of risk cause the cost of capital to rise and, with widespread 
uncertainty, countries become reluctant to lend to other countries. Therefore capital 
flows shrink and this means current account deficits and surpluses will contract. Such 
changes in current account balances affect trade balances and hence exports and 
imports. Facilitating all these adjustments will be changes in real exchange rates that 
affects the relative price of tradeables and non-tradeables and hence the supply and 
demand of exports and imports. 
Falling output, trade and employment leads to unpleasant social consequences and so 
causes policy makers to counteract the effects and stimulate the economy. There are 
three ways policy makers look after their constituents. One is to ease monetary policy. 
Another is to stimulate domestic demand through expansionary fiscal policy. This can 
occur through hand-outs to households via tax breaks or direct payments, by extra 
government spending, often on infrastructure, or subsidies to producers, such as car 
makers. Extra spending by governments means extra borrowing in the first instance and 
this affects capital flows and trade once again. The third way governments sometimes 
choose to ‘look after their own’ is by protection: either by overt border measures such    4
 
as tariff increases or more subtle ones such as “Buy Local” programs. Financial 
protection, for example where banks or firms are directed to lend at home, can also 
occur. Financial protection will affect relative rates of return and hence capital flows 
and trade.  
All of the above mechanisms affect trade. Some will compound each other, others will 
be offsetting. The only to understand some of the key drivers is by use of a model as set 
out below.   5
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The G-Cubed model is an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the world 
economy. The theoretical structure is outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998)
2. A 
number of studies—summarized in McKibbin and Vines (2000)—show that the G-
cubed modelling approach has been useful in assessing a range of issues across a 
number of countries since the mid-1980s.
3  Some of the principal features of the model 
are as follows: 
  The model is based on explicit intertemporal optimization by the agents (consumers 
and firms) in each economy
4. In contrast to static CGE models, time and dynamics 
are of fundamental importance in the G-Cubed model.  The MSG-Cubed model is 
known as a DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model in the 
macroeconomics literature and a Dynamic Intertemporal General Equilibrium 
(DIGE) model in the computable general equilibrium literature. 
  In order to track the macro time series, the behavior of agents is modified to allow 
for short run deviations from optimal behavior either due to myopia or to restrictions 
on the ability of households and firms to borrow at the risk free bond rate on 
government debt. For both households and firms, deviations from intertemporal 
optimizing behavior take the form of rules-of-thumb, which are consistent with an 
optimizing agent that does not update predictions based on new information about 
future events. These rules-of-thumb are chosen to generate the same steady state 
behavior as optimizing agents so that in the long run there is only a single 
intertemporal optimizing equilibrium of the model. In the short run, actual behavior 
is assumed to be a weighted average of the optimizing and the rule-of-thumb 
assumptions. Thus aggregate consumption is a weighted average of consumption 
based on wealth (current asset valuation and expected future after tax labor income) 
and consumption based on current disposable income. Similarly, aggregate 
investment is a weighted average of investment based on Tobin’s q (a market 
valuation of the expected future change in the marginal product of capital relative to 
the cost) and investment based on a backward looking version of Q. 
  There is an explicit treatment of the holding of financial assets, including money. 
Money is introduced into the model through a restriction that households require 
money to purchase goods.  
  The model also allows for short run nominal wage rigidity (by different degrees in 
different countries) and therefore allows for significant periods of unemployment 
depending on the labor market institutions in each country. This assumption, when 
taken together with the explicit role for money, is what gives the model its 
                                                      
 
2   Full details of the model including a list of equations and parameters can be found online at: www.gcubed.com 
3   These issues include: Reaganomics in the 1980s; German Unification in the early 1990s; fiscal consolidation in 
Europe in the mid-1990s; the formation of NAFTA; the Asian crisis; and the productivity boom in the US. 
4   See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).    7
 
“macroeconomic” characteristics. (Here again the model's assumptions differ from 
the standard market clearing assumption in most CGE models.)  
  The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors and 
within countries and the flexibility of financial capital, which immediately flows to 
where expected returns are highest. This important distinction leads to a critical 
difference between the quantity of physical capital that is available at any time to 
produce goods and services, and the valuation of that capital as a result of decisions 
about the allocation of financial capital. 
As a result of this structure, the G-Cubed model contains rich dynamic behaviour, 
driven on the one hand by asset accumulation and, on the other by wage adjustment to a 
neoclassical steady state. It embodies a wide range of assumptions about individual 
behaviour and empirical regularities in a general equilibrium framework. The 
interdependencies are solved out using a computer algorithm that solves for the rational 
expectations equilibrium of the global economy. It is important to stress that the term 
‘general equilibrium’ is used to signify that as many interactions as possible are 
captured, not that all economies are in a full market clearing equilibrium at each point in 
time. Although it is assumed that market forces eventually drive the world economy to 
neoclassical steady state growth equilibrium, unemployment does emerge for long 
periods due to wage stickiness, to an extent that differs between countries due to 
differences in labor market institutions. 
In the version of the model used here there are 6 sectors (energy, mining, agriculture, 
manufacturing durables, manufacturing non-durables and services) and 15 
countries/regions as set out in Table 2.2. 
2.2 Countries/regions 
United States  China 
Japan India 
United Kingdom  Other Asia 
Germany Latin  America 
Euro Area  Other LDC 
Canada  East Europe & Former Soviet Union 
Australia OPEC 
Rest of OECD   
    8
 
 
3. Simulating the effects of the crisis 
Events leading up to the crisis in 2008— the baseline 
The focus of this study is on disentangling the many influences of the financial crisis on 
trade outcomes. The  ‘crisis’ is defined here as the bursting of the housing market 
bubble  in late 2007, the ensuing collapse in the sub-prime mortgage market and related 
financial markets and the subsequent collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 which 
resulted in a sharp increase in risk premia around the world. The effect of the financial 
crisis on global trade is therefore the difference between a world where there was no 
crisis and one where there is. That is, to assess the effects of the crisis on trade, a 
baseline, or “business as usual”, view of a world without a crisis has to be produced.  
There are two aspects to this baseline. One is the exogenous productivity and population 
trends going forward and the other is the underlying imbalances brewing in the world 
economy prior to the financial crisis itself. We assume that tax rates and the shares of 
government spending devoted to each commodity remain unchanged. In the G-Cubed 
model, projections are usually made based on a range of input assumptions. There are 
two key inputs into the growth rate of each sector in the model. The first is the economy 
wide population projection which differs by country according to the UN mid- 
projection. The second is the sectoral productivity growth rates. How the sectoral 
productivity growth rates are calculated is a little detailed so is set out in Appendix A. 
In the long run we take the underlying long-run rate of world population growth plus 
productivity growth to be 1.8 percent per annum, and take the long-run real interest rate 
to be 4 percent.   
The second aspect of a baseline is some of the prior events to the crisis. The problem is 
that some of the seeds of the financial crisis were sown in the decade before the crisis.  
A series of large global events, such as the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001 and 
the  rapid growth of China, were already reshaping the pattern and level of world trade 
before the 2007-2008 financial crisis hit. Some of these events, like the large disparities 
between savings and investment in China (a surplus) and in the United States (a deficit) 
led to large differences between exports and imports for each nation so that large current 
account surpluses were accumulating in China and large deficits in America. Some 
people5 attribute these growing global imbalances as contributing causes of the crisis, 
and there is some truth in that. But the focus of this study is on the impact of the crisis 
itself on world trade and not on trying to disentangle the various contributing factors to 
the crisis, as important as that issue is.   
                                                      
 
5 For example, see Max Corden, The world credit crisis: understanding it and what to do, 
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/wp/wp2008n25.pdf and Martin Wolf, How imbalances led 
to credit crunch and inflation, Financial Times, June 17 2008.    9
 
Therefore, besides population and productivity trends shaping the baseline for the 
world, some of the key events over the last decade influencing the baseline would be: 
  First, there was the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, which saw Asian economies 
generate large current account surpluses that had to be invested offshore to keep their 
nominal exchange rates low. Capital flowed out of Asia into US dotcom stocks 
driving up equity prices. 
  Next was the bursting of the dotcom bubble, which saw the booming NASDAQ over 
1998–2000 burst in 2001. 
  Fearing a downturn and possible deflation, the US Federal Reserve eased monetary 
policy in 2001 in a series of steps to 2004. Some argue that they eased too much for 
too long6. 
  But, with easy credit and a rising housing market, a boom in house prices followed 
and a period of high growth in credit and leveraged loans. Risk premia hit low levels 
and leveraged deals became common as investors chased yields in an environment of 
lax regulatory oversight. 
  Rising demands from China (and, to some extent, India), plus a booming world 
economy saw commodity prices rise across oil, minerals and food from late 2004 to 
late 2007. The shock to the global economy from this commodity price boom was as 
big as the first oil shock in the 1970s. 
  Rising prices and inflation caused monetary authorities to tighten policy from mid-
2004 to June 2006. 
 
Each of these major events set up their own dynamics for the course of the world 
economy and helped shape the underlying baseline. Some of these events such as the 
easing and tightening of monetary policy are endogenous to the model and already 
incorporated in the baseline.  It is important to appreciate that the results reported here 
are deviations from baseline from the financial crisis, as defined here. What is important 
is the relative contribution of different effects and to disentangle the impacts of the 
financial crisis on trade outcomes.  
 
The six shocks to represent the crisis and the policy responses 
The above events have led to the now well known global downturn. All official 
forecasting agencies, such as the IMF and OECD, have described this downturn and so 
will not be expanded here. As the IMF notes ‘Global GDP is estimated to have fallen by 
an unprecedented 5 per cent in the fourth quarter (annualized), led by advanced 
economies, which contracted by around 7 per cent’ 7. Japan has been particularly hard 
                                                      
 
6 Notably John Taylor, see Taylor, J.B. 2008, The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical 
Analysis of What Went Wrong. 
7 IMF 2009, Group of Twenty, Meeting of the Ministers and Central Bank Governors March 13-14, 2009, 
London UK, p. 4.    10
 
hit with a fourth quarter GDP (2008) plummeting by 13 per cent. Demand for durable 
goods has been particularly hard hit. With the downturn there has been a sharp upturn in 
savings by households (and commensurate reduction in consumption), driven by a 
reappraisal of risk by households and a loss of net worth with falling house prices and 
equity prices. So shocks need to be devised to account for three things; 
  The bursting of the housing bubble and loss in asset prices and household wealth 
with consumers cutting back on spending and lifting savings. 
  A sharp reappraisal of risk with a spike in bond spreads on corporate loans and 
interbank lending rates with the cost of credit, including trade credit, rising with a 
commensurate collapse of stock markets around the world.  
  A massive policy response including a monetary policy easing, bailouts of financial 
institutions and fiscal stimulus. Also, signs of emerging trade and financial 
protectionism appear. 
These three outcomes can be represented by six shocks — three for the crisis itself and 
three for the policy response.  
 
Three main shocks capture the onset of the global financial crisis: 
1. The bursting of the housing bubble causing a reallocation of capital and a loss of 
household wealth and drop in consumption. 
2. A sharp rise in the equity risk premium (the risk premium of equities over bonds) 
causing the cost of capital to rise, private investment to fall and demand for durable 
goods to collapse. 
3. A reappraisal of risk by households causing them to discount their future labor 
income and increase savings and decrease consumption. 
 
Shock 1: The bursting of the housing bubble 
Falling house prices had a major effect on household wealth, spending and defaults on 
loans held by financial institutions. Events in the United States typify a global 
phenomenon. From 2000 to 2006, house prices in some areas doubled to subsequently 
collapse (chart 3.1). These changes in some areas have generated dramatic news 
headlines but, overall the United States index of house prices has fallen by 6.2 percent 
in real terms from the 1
st quarter 2008 to the same quarter in 2009 8.   
While house prices were rising so strongly, credit was supplied liberally to meet the 
demand as perceptions of risk fell. The rising wealth boosted confidence and spending. 
The housing bubble was a global phenomenon centered mainly on the Anglo-Saxon 
world. 
                                                      
 
8 Federal Housing Finance Agency May 2009, http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2406/1q09hpi.pdf    11
 
3.1  US house prices relative to per capita household income 



























In the sun belt as house prices rose,
perceptions of risk declined and
credit standards declined boosting
demand and driving prices higher.
As the bubble burst, seemingly 'safe
as bricks and mortar' investments
lost almost half of their value, one of
the root causes of the current
financial problems. But prices are
now much closer to fair value.
 
a Notes: Series shown are house prices over per capita household income. For comparison 
series are indexed to a common base 2000=100. Individual cities are from the S&P Case 
Schiller index. National prices are from the OFHEO. OFHEO data has a complete coverage of 
the US while the Case Schiller index only covers the largest 20 cities. OFHEO and Case 
Schiller data for individual cities indicate similar movements – i.e. differences in the series 
largely reflect the coverage differences. (The widely reported Case Schiller index shows much 
larger falls than the OFHEO index.) 
Data source: Standard and Poors, Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight, OECD Economic 
Outlook Database.    12
 
The housing bubble was the result of a long period of low interest rates by the US 
Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve cut interest rates by a total of 550 basis points in 
a series of steps between 2001 and 2004. The easing, subsequent tightening and current 
easing are shown in chart 3.2. Some believe (for example the ‘Austrian school’ and 
John Taylor9), that monetary policy was too loose for too long and this is what gave rise 
to the asset price bubble and commodity price spike. Taylor argues that had the Federal 
Reserve followed the Taylor rule (actually the Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule), 
interest rates would have risen much sooner and the bubbles n would not have appeared 
to the same extent (chart 3.2). 




































Note: The daily effective federal funds rate is a weighted average of rates on brokered trades. 
Weekly figures are averages of 7 calendar days ending on Wednesday of the current week; 
monthly figures include each calendar day in the month. Annualised using a 360-day year or 
bank interest. 
Data source: US Federal Reserve Statistical Release, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15_FF_O.txt, Accessed 5 March 
2009. 
While low interest rates were due to fears of deflation10 and led to a boom in US 
housing, low interest rates were not just the result of the Fed’s actions. US bond yields 
were also low because of low world rates (with Japanese bond yields at a little over 1 
per cent and short term interest rates at zero). There was also an international aspect to 
low US interest rates with Japan and Europe only recovering very slowly from the 
2000-01 downturn and in turn placing pressure on the US to keep interest rates low. In 
Japan there were fears of re-emergent deflation. That is the principal reason why interest 
rates were kept low in the US for an unusually long term — until mid-2004 when the 
Fed began a very sharp tightening cycle11. The low interest rates through 2003-04 — 
                                                      
 
9  Taylor, J.B. 2008, The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went 
Wrong, p. 2. 
10 For example, see Alan Greenspan’s account in The Age of Turbulence, Allen Lane, 2007, pp228-229. 
11 The sharpest, in fact, since the Volker deflation of the early 1980s.    13
 
besides fuelling a boom in bank lending, rising asset prices and rising demand in China 
and other developing countries — also fuelled a commodity price boom. 
However, only a part of the dwelling boom and the commodity boom can be attributed 
to the actions of the Fed. The up-trend in US house prices was evident as early as 2000. 
As small investors abandoned the stock market in 2001, they dived into the housing 
market, driving up and sustaining the price rises. Similarly, the surge in commodity 
prices through 2005 to 2008, which took most analysts by surprise, had as much to do 
with developments in China, and the lagged response of supply, as they did with an 
increase in demand in North America. Where the real problem lay was in the 
combination of the two.  
The bursting of the housing bubble is modelled as a surprise fall in the expected flow of 
services from housing investment – larger in the United States, United Kingdom and 
Europe but still significant throughout the world.  In the model, the household in each 
economy is modelled as solving an intertemporal consumption problem subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint. The result is a time profile for the consumer in each 
country of consumption of goods from all countries based on expected future income 
and expected relative goods prices. The household also chooses investment in a capital 
good. The household capital stock combines housing, and other durable goods. For 
simplicity of exposition we will refer to this capital good as “housing” from here on.  
The investment decision by households is modelled analogously to how we model the 
investment decisions of firms within an intertemporal framework subject to adjustment 
costs for capital accumulation. The household invests in housing to maximize 
consumption from the stream of future service flows that housing provides. This stream 
of services is analogous to a production function based on inputs of capital and a 
productivity term. We model the housing part of the crisis as a fall in the productivity of 
the service flow from the housing stock. This fall in expected future productivity of 
housing means that the Tobin’s q for housing drops when the shock occurs. The drop in 
housing productivity in the United States is assumed to be 10 per cent lower in 2009 
and is calibrated to give, along with the other shocks, a drop in house prices in the US of 
the order of 6 per cent, roughly what has been observed for the last year12. A plausible 
scenario is where productivity returns to ‘normal’ by 2013. 
Shock 2: Rising equity risk premia 
The surprise up-swing in commodity prices from 2003 but most noticeable during 2006 
and 2007 led to concerns about inflation leading to the sharp reversal in monetary policy 
in the US. This tightening in US policy also implied a tightening of monetary policy in 
economies that pegged to the US dollar. It was the sharpness of this reversal as much as  
                                                      
 
12 A 10 per cent permanent drop in housing productivity in the United States alone gives a 5.4 per 
cent drop in housing values one year later. See McKibbin, W and Stoeckel, A, Bursting of the US 
housing Bubble, Economic Scenarios No 14, www.economicscenarios.com.    14
 
 
the fall in US house prices and the failures of financial regulation (for example, the 
mortgage underwriters Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) that led to the financial problems 
for 2008-0913. Lehman Brothers’ failure was primarily due to the large losses they 
sustained on the US subprime mortgage market. Lehman's held large positions in the 
subprime and other lower-rated mortgage markets. But mortgage delinquencies rose 
after the US housing price bubble burst in 2006-07. In the second fiscal quarter 2008, 
Lehman reported losses of $2.8 billion. It was forced to sell off $6 billion in assets14. 
The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and effect on risk premiums across 
markets can be seen clearly on chart 3.3.  
 
The rise in the equity risk premium since the collapse of Lehman Brothers has been of 
the order of 8 percentage points. A plausible scenario where confidence is gradually 
restored so things are back to ‘normal’ by 2013 is therefore assumed. 
–  Under this scenario, balance sheets of financial institutions are gradually restored 
through existing and new programs to address distressed assets. Combined with 
new capital raising, confidence and lending returns. Also, investors learn to live 
                                                      
 
13 Similarly, the tightening cycle of the mid-1980s was one factor leading to the Savings and Loan 
crisis. 
14 New York Times, Thursday, 26 February 2009. 
3.3  The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and risk premia 





















The risk premium on short-term inter-bank
borrowing rose sharply when Lehman Brothers
entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in
September 2008. This pushed up the premium on
corporate borrowing relative to US treasuries. As
the real economy has deteriorated, corporate risk








a Notes: Weekly data. Risk premium on inter-bank borrowing approximated by the rate on one 
month Euro-dollar deposits less the Federal funds rate. Risk premium on corporate bonds 
measured as the yield on BAA rated corporate bonds less the 10 year Treasury bond yield. 
Data source: Federal Reserve Board.    15
 
with the ‘new world’ and economic recovery encourages new investment and a 
virtuous circle of further improvements in confidence. 
–  This scenario is plausible in the opinion of the authors. The world will recover but 
the size and speed of the drop in economic activity has been a salutary lesson for 
investors who are not likely to forget that quickly. So, to capture the collapse of 
commodity prices and the financial sector, an initial rise in the equity risk 
premium of 8 percentage points for the United States is taken for the six sectors in 
the model: the energy, mining, agriculture, durable and non durable 
manufacturing and services sectors in 2009 and then dissipates in equal steps over 
the next four years but staying permanently higher by 2 percent from 2012. The 
permanent rise in the risk premium reflects the baseline risk premium which is 
assumed to be close to zero in the projection based on the experience from 2003. 
Thus there is an overshoot in the return to “normal”. 
Shock 3: A rise in household risk 
The reappraisal of risk by firms as a result of the crisis also applies to households. As 
households view the future as being more risky, so they discount their future earnings 
and that affects their savings and spending decisions. The increase in household risk in 
the United States is assumed to be 3 percentage points in the ‘plausible’ scenario in 
2009, half that in 2010 and back to ‘normal’ in 2011 and thereafter.  
Summary of three crisis shocks and country differences 
The three shocks by sector the United States are shown in table 3.4. 
3.4  Equity risk premium, household risk and housing productivity for the United 
States under the plausible scenario 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
…beyond 
2014 
Plausible scenario     
Equity risk premium by 
sector:    
– E n e r g y  86422   2  
– M i n i n g  86422   2  
– Agriculture  86422  2  
– durable manufacturing  8 6 4 2 2  2 
– non durable 
manufacturing 8 6 4 2 2  2 
– s e r v i c e s  86422   2  
    
Household risk 3 1 . 5000   0  
Housing productivity -10 -8 -6 -4 -4 - 4 
Source: authors’ calculations.    16
 
 
The shocks in table 3.4 are for the United States — the ‘epicentre’ of the crisis. But not 
all countries have been equally affected by the crisis. For example, durable 
manufacturing in Japan would be hit harder by the risk reappraisal given the collapse of 
their durable exports (dominated by cars) as a result of the combination of the global 
downturn and the appreciation of the Yen that resulted from the collapse in commodity 
prices and improvement in their terms of trade. 
Also, Japan had their housing bubble a decade earlier than did the United States, so over 
the last few years they never experienced a property bubble as in America. So the shock 
to their economy from the bursting of the housing bubble would be less than for the 
United States. Therefore the shocks for equity risk, the housing bubble bursting and 
household risk are scaled off the United States. Taking the United States as 1 a series of 
weights for other sectors and economies appears in table 3.5. 
 
3.5  Weight for country and sector shocks 
 USA JPN GBR  DEU EUR CAN AUS OEC CHI IND OAS  LAM LDC EEB OPC
Equity risk by 
s e c t o r                  
– energy  1  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
– mining  1  1  1  1 1 1.2 1.2 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
– agriculture  1  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
– durable 
manufacturing  1 1.2  1 1.2 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
– non durable 
manufacturing  1  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
– services  1  1 1.2  1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
          
Household risk  1 0.3  1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Household 
productivity  1 0.1  1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Three main shocks capture the policy responses 
On top of the above three financial crisis shocks there has been an unprecedented policy 
response comprising three more elements: 
4. An easing of monetary policy to near zero official rates of interest in major 
developed economies.   
5. An easing of fiscal policy across countries and large run-up in government deficits.  
6. A rise in trade and financial protectionism.    17
 
Shock 4: Monetary easing 
There is an endogenous monetary response in the model for each economy where each 
economy follows a Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule  as shown in equation (1) with 
different weights on inflation (π) relative to target, output growth (Δy) relative to 
potential and the change in the exchange rate (Δe) relative to target.  






t t t t             3 2 1 1      (1) 
The assumed parameter values are set out in Table 3.6. Note that China and most 
developing economies have a non- zero weight on the change in the $US exchange rate. 
The monetary easing that has occurred is close to the endogenous monetary policy 
response already built into the model so any extra monetary stimulus is not required. Of 
course it is possible that authorities, being fearful of raising interest rates too early and 
pricking the nascent recovery, could end up easing too much for too long and would be 
an interesting simulation, especially if different countries chose different amounts of 
‘over-easing’ which would set up capital flow changes and hence trade flow changes. 
 
3.6: Coefficients in Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor Rules in Each Country 
 inflation  (β1) output  growth  (β2) $US Exchange rate (β3) 
USA 0.5  0.5 0 
JPN 0.5  0.5 0 
GBR 0.5  0.5 0 
DEU (*)  0.5  0.5 0 
EUR (*)  0.5  0.5 0 
CAN 0.5  0.5 0 
AUS 0.5  0.5 0 
OEC 0.5  0.5 0 
CHI 0.5  0.5 -1 
IND 0.5  0.5 0 
OAS 0.5  0.5 -1 
LAM 0.5  0.5 -1 
LDC 0.5  0.5 -1 
EEB 0.5  0.5 -1 
OPC 0.5  0.5 -10 
 
(*) Note that Germany (DEU) and the rest of the Eurozone (EUR) have a 
common interest rate with a weight on European wide inflation and output gap. 
 
 
Shock 5: Fiscal easing 
There is an endogenous fiscal policy response in the model but the rule is a targeting of 
fiscal deficits as a percent of GDP. The easing of fiscal policy announced by most 
economies has been an extra unprecedented stimulus in the modern era and expansion 
of fiscal deficits and has to be simulated.    18
 
The discretionary stimulus packages announced by each country has mainly occurred 
over 2009 and 2010 and is usefully summarised by the OECD15. For the United States 
the cumulative stimulus is nearly 5 per cent of GDP and for China it is over 11 per cent 
of GDP. It is unlikely that such a stimulus will suddenly end in 2010 for two reasons: it 
is hard to crank up government spending on things like infrastructure quickly and 
governments usually find it hard to reign in spending quickly once programs are 
announced. Therefore, whilst assuming the same cumulative fiscal response as outlined 
by the OECD and other studies, the fiscal response has been assumed to taper off 




3.7  The assumed fiscal policy response per cent of GDP 
Country/region 2009 2010 2012 2013 Cumulative 
United States  2.07 1.55 1.04 0.52 5.18 
Japan  1.46 1.10 0.73 0.37 3.65 
United Kingdom  1.32 0.99 0.66 0.33 3.29 
Germany  1.38 1.04 0.69 0.35 3.45 
Euro area  1.30 0.98 0.65 0.33 3.25 
Canada  1.68 1.26 0.84 0.42 4.20 
Australia  2.48 1.86 1.24 0.62 6.21 
Rest of OECD  1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 2.50 
China  4.80 3.60 2.40 1.20 12.00 
India  0.50 0.38 0.25 0.13 1.25 
Other Asia  2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 5.00 
Latin America  0.50 0.38 0.25 0.13 1.25 
Other LDC  0.50 0.38 0.25 0.13 1.25 
EEFSU  1.70 1.28 0.85 0.43 4.25 
OPEC  3.00 2.25 1.50 0.75 7.50 
Source: OECD 2009 and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Shock 6: Rise in trade and financial protectionism 
Rising trade protectionism is a real threat. It occurred during the Great Depression and 
is attributed with making matters far worse. The main driver for this protectionism was 
to protect jobs. The Smoot-Hawley legislation in the United States at the time of the 
                                                      
 
15 OECD 2009, Fiscal Packages Across OECD Countries: Overview and Country Details, Paris, 31 March.    19
 
Great Depression saw tariffs increase and help trigger the beggar-thy-neighbour round 
of tariff increases by other countries. Could it happen again?  
The answer is that it has already started, albeit on a small scale so far. At the G-20 
meeting in November last year, leaders affirmed their commitment to open trade and 
declared they would not put up more barriers. Yet within 36 hours, India and Russia, 
two attendees at the summit had put up some trade barriers16. Just about every major, 
and minor car producer for that matter, has given its domestic industry various 
concoctions of subsidies, grants and soft loans. President Obama was implored to weed 
out the ‘Buy American’ provisions in his fiscal stimulus package. Although ‘softened’, 
it got through.  
It is worth remembering that at the time of the introduction of the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
during the Great Depression, over 1000 economists petitioned about the harm the 
legislation would cause. Smoot-Hawley was nevertheless signed into law. Such is the 
power of politics. Actually there are two political problems. One is the obvious loss of 
jobs and ability of narrow vested interest groups to look after themselves in times of 
crisis at the expense of the common good.  
The other political problem is the free-rider one. It goes as follows. When all countries 
are affected by the downturn, monetary policy is far less effective because all countries 
cannot devalue against each other. And with the drastic loss of confidence, business is 
reluctant to borrow and invest irrespective of the level of interest rates. Hence countries 
have to rely on fiscal stimulus to encourage a recovery. But it is tempting for countries 
to free ride on others like the United States, who need to implement big fiscal stimulus 
packages, part of which will spill over to imports. Taxpayers, bearing the future burden 
of the fiscal stimulus, naturally want to get the ‘biggest bang for their buck’ but wrongly 
think that is achieved by keeping the spending at home. Hence the ‘Buy American’ 
provisions in their stimulus bill. Other countries, most recently China, have followed 
suit17. But if there is global co-ordination of proportionally similar stimulus packages, 
most of the leakage washes out as gains elsewhere. Some of the protectionist sentiment 
is a result of a lack of global coordination of policy. 
WTO members are only legally required to not increase tariffs above their ‘bound’ 
rates. However there can be special exemptions invoked and there are ways to impose 
protection that raise effective rather than observed tariff rates.  
Rising financial protectionism is a real threat as well and has already been observed. For 
example, some countries, faced with undercapitalized banks unwilling to lend on the 
same basis as before the crisis and with taxpayers shoring up bank reserves, have 
directed their banks to lend locally.  Other restrictions on foreign bank operations are 
                                                      
 
16 Although Russia is not yet a member of the WTO and bound by their laws, they still declared, 
along with the other G-20 participants, not to increase tariffs. 
17 For example see news report in the Financial times http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66454774-5a7c-
11de-8c14-00144feabdc0.html    20
 
bound to emerge in the regulatory aftermath that is now following the crisis. All of these 
actions have the effect of widening disparities between rates of return and therefore 
affect global capital flows and, in turn, trade. But modeling this effect requires estimates 
of how big this effect might be and, as none are readily available, the effect of financial 
protectionism has not been included in this analysis. The result is trade impacts from the 
crisis are likely to be understated. 
Two potential effects not specifically covered by the six shocks 
There are two other potential effects on trade not specifically covered by the 
simulations. First is that the model is an annual one and while it allows for stock-
adjustment dynamics across years, there can be important within-year effects, 
particularly on trade. The second is the effect of rising interest rates on trade credit. 
Again while the data in the model has embedded in it the cost of credit on all 
transactions, trade credit might involve relatively higher costs and could be argued has a 
depressing effect on international trade. 
Inventory cycle and trade 
Over the last twenty years, the globalisation of manufacturing production chains and the 
large increase in global trade has meant that a much greater proportion of inventories in 
any individual country are imported. Hence a sharp down shift in the inventory cycle 
from the month of December 2008 onwards has probably been a significant factor 
behind the sharp downturn in world trade over the first quarter of 2009. It also appears 
to be a significant factor behind the downward revision of the OECD’s forecasts for the 
global economy since November.  
The sharp drop in global sales in December 2008 led to a sharp increase in the stock-to-
sales ratio, particularly for OECD economies. Typical of the pattern in the stock-to-sales 
ratio is highlighted by Japan (chart 3.8). This pattern was repeated internationally with 
particularly large increases in most major OECD economies. In the Euro area and 
Japan, in the December 2008 quarter, retailers and manufacturers built up stocks, as the 
drop in sales caught them by surprise. The opposite was true in countries like the UK, 
Korea and Australia where inventories were run down relatively quickly. 
The large increases in stock to sales ratios in Japan, the Euro area and the rest of the 
world, will mean that there were significant run downs in stocks in the first half of 2009. 
These added to the impact of the falls in sales on production.    21
 
3.8  Japanese manufacturing stocks to sales ratio 

























Data source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and CIE calculation. 
 
The key feature about the inventory cycle for this study is that it will account for some 
of the large monthly drops in trade volumes that have generated headline grabbing 
attention. Year-on-year effects, the focus of this model, are likely to be much less. 
Trade credit 
At the time of the onset of the financial crisis in September 2008 there was much 
publicity given to the shortage of credit as banks stopped lending. For example, Auboin 
from the WTO Secretariat described a $25 billion shortfall in trade credit in November 
2008 18.  A shortage of trade credit would impact on world trade on the supply side but 
it also seems much of the contraction was a collapse on the demand side as orders were 
cancelled once business realised they were holding excess inventories as described 
above. A study by the World Bank estimates the shortfall in trade finance accounting 
for 10 – 15% of the fall in world trade19. Being of small magnitude this effect is 
omitted from this study. 
 
4. Effects of crisis without a fiscal policy response 
                                                      
 
18 Auboin, M, 2009 , The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for 
the G20, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. 
19 Reported in International Economics Weekly, What’s happening to world trade? Part II, 24 April 2009    22
 
Mechanisms at work 
To appreciate the mechanisms at work from the three shocks an illustrative scenario 
where shocks affect the United States alone is shown in chart 4.1. The bursting of the 
housing bubble has the biggest negative impact on real consumption, which being 
roughly 70 percent of the domestic economy, has the biggest negative impact on real 
GDP. The permanent loss in wealth causes consumption to fall sharply and because the 
housing shock is assumed to be permanent, consumption is permanently lower in all 
periods as shown on Chart 4.1.  
The financial shock has the largest negative impact on stock market values from 
baseline in 2009 and an equally large impact as the bursting of the housing bubble on 
investment. The equity risk shock causes a shift out of equities into other domestic 
assets, such as housing and government bonds as well as to asset purchases overseas. 
The shift into government bonds drives up their prices and pushes down real interest 
rates substantially. This surprisingly raises human wealth because expected future after 
tax income is discounted at a much lower real interest rate. Thus in the US, the equity 
shock alone is positive rather than negative for consumption in the short run. 
Investment on the other hand falls sharply. The equity shock reduces US investment by 
about 15 percent below baseline. The rise in equity risk implies a sharp sell-off of shares 
due to a large rise in the required rate of return to capital. The higher equity risk 
premium implies that the existing capital stock is too high to generate the marginal 
product required from the financial arbitrage condition and investment falls and, over 
time, due to the existence of adjustment costs, the capital stock falls and potential output 
is permanently reduced. 
Under this simulation where the US alone is assumed to be affected by the crisis, there 
is little impact on US exports (bottom left hand panel of chart 4.1) because there is little 
net impact on the rest of the world. The negative trade effects are offset by positive 
effects from United States capital going elsewhere as elaborated below. But as the drop 
in US consumption hits imports, the trade balance improves over baseline especially in 
2009 and remains that way until 2013. 
Each of the three shocks has a negative effect on the United States and, combined, has 
the effect of lowering real GDP by 4 percent below baseline in 2009 and real GDP does 
not return to baseline until 2017, nearly a decade later. That is sufficient to put the US 
into recession in 2009 (baseline growth is 3.4 percent) but will allow positive growth in 
201020. 
                                                      
 
20 Note that all results are presented as deviations from a baseline projection. A fall in GDP of 4% in 
year 1, relative to baseline, where the baseline growth rate was 3% is a new growth rate in the 
first year of negative 1% (i.e. a recession). If the level of GDP remains 4% lower forever the 
growth rate of GDP in year 2 is back at baseline growth. Thus in growth rate terms, the crisis is 
resolved after the first year in many countries although the level of GDP remains below baseline 
for many years.    23
 
A key compositional effect also occurs when household discount rates rise and risk 
premia generally rise. The effect is a much sharper fall in the demand for durable goods 
relative to other goods in the economy. This is shown clearly in Chart 4.2. Imports and 
domestic production of durable goods fall by more than non durable goods. The 
differences are substantial. The high risk adjusted cost leads to a reduction in the flow of 
services from durables and therefore the demand for these goods drops sharply. This 
compositional effect is critical for the trade outcomes. Countries that export durable 
goods are particularly affected by a crisis of the type modelled. 
The recession in the United States has two main effects on the world economy. One is 
the negative knock-on effect from the loss in activity with those economies most 
dependent on the United States market most affected. The second effect runs counter to 
the first. As prospects dim in the United States, so the returns on investment look better 
elsewhere. Money flows out of the United States (or strictly in the case of the US, less 
inflow than otherwise) and into other economies where it stimulates investment and 
economic activity. This is illustrated by the effect on China (see chart 4.3). The United 
States is a large importer from China. As US imports fall, China’s exports fall (see 
bottom left hand panel of 4.3), with a combined effect from the three shocks of a drop in  
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Data source: G-Cubed model simulations    25
 
4.2  Impact of a US only financial crisis on Durables verus Non-Durable goods in 
the United States 


































durables - imports non-durables - imports durables - production non-durables - production  
Data source: G-Cubed model simulations 
 
exports of 5 percent below baseline in 2009. China’s trade balance worsens, but note 
how small the effect is: barely 1 percent below baseline (as a percent of GDP).  
Note also the net small effect on China’s real GDP even though China’s exports are a 
large proportion of their GDP. When the United States alone is affected by the crisis, 
there is a small combined effect on China of a reduction in real GDP of 0.75 percent 
below baseline in 2009 and a positive effect from 2011 onwards. Looking at China’s 
real investment provides the answer. Because investment prospects in the United States 
are now dire under the combined scenario, money flows elsewhere, one recipient of 
which is China. China’s real investment could be 3.5 percent above baseline in 2011 
and 2012, in response to the relatively better investment prospects. China gains at the 
United States’ expense. The favourable stimulus from extra investment largely offsets 
and eventually outweighs the negative effects from the loss of exports to the United 
States. 
The conclusion is that the financial crisis which started in the United States, had it been 
confined to the US alone, would not have had dire consequences for the world 
economy. Of course the real story is different. Contagion and rising risk premiums 
everywhere have caused a different scenario. When everyone is affected the 
consequences for the United States also depends on who and how other countries are 
affected.     26
 




































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations 
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Projected outlook from the global financial crisis without fiscal stimulus 
 
When all economies are affected by the global financial crisis through global changes in 
risk premia and loss of consumer confidence, other countries like China are adversely 
affected. When other economies are also adversely affected by the reappraisal of risk, 
the cost of capital for them also rises and, in effect, causes the existing capital stock to 
be too large. Investment plummets, but not everywhere because it is relative effects that 
matter. The impact on investment is shown in chart set 4.4. Whereas Chinese 
investment rose when just the United States was assumed to be affected by the crisis, 
now Chinese investment falls to a low of over 8 percent below baseline in 2010. Real 
interest rates fall everywhere by over 400 basis points both reflecting a long run decline 
in marginal product of capital but also reflecting a response of monetary authorities in 
lowering nominal interest rates. 
Under the assumptions of the smaller rise in risk premia across Latin America and 
LDCs, these regions gain relatively from the global reallocation of investment. 
Investment in Latin America could be over 15 percent higher over baseline in 2009 and 
2010 and well over 20 percent for LDCs for the same years. Latin America and other 
LDCs do not go into recession (see chart set 4.5) as a result of the global financial crisis 
as represented by the three shocks used in this study. In fact, those two regions 
experience a slight boost to real GDP. While some Latin American economies such as 
Argentina are not faring well at the moment, there are other forces at work such as 
drought and the impact of taxes on their exports. The results in the appendix graphs do 
show that exports from Latin America and LDCs to be hit hard, however. They could be 
30 percent below baseline in both 2009 and 2010.  
One of the key features of the crisis in reflected in the results in chart set 4.5. There is a 
substantially larger contraction in exports relative to the contraction in GDP in all 
economies. This massive shift in the relationship between trade and GDP is not the 
result of an assumption about the income elasticity of imports. It reflects some key 
characteristics of the model. First, imports are modeled on a bilateral basis between 
countries where imports are partly for final demand by households and government and 
partly for intermediate inputs across the six sectors.  In addition, investment is 
undertaken by a capital sector that uses domestic and imported goods from domestic 
production and imported sources. As consumption and investment collapse more than 
GDP, imports will contract more than GDP. One country’s imports are another 
country’s exports thus exports will contract more than GDP unless there is a change in 
the trade position of a particular country. The assumption that all risk premia rise and 
the results that all real interest rates falls everywhere implies small changes in trade 
balances- a finding consistent with actual outcomes.    28
 


















































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations 
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Data source: G-Cubed model simulations    30
 
 
5. Effects of policy responses 
The results so far have built in a monetary reaction function in the form of a Henderson-
McKibbin-Taylor rule for each economy with the short term nominal interest rate 
adjusting to a variety of factors in each economy. The rules assumed in the model have 
generated an endogenous monetary response which is similar to that observed so far. 
The assumption of an unchanged fiscal deficit is very different from what has been 
observed. In this section we focus on announced fiscal responses. The esimated fiscal 
policy changes were given earlier in Table 3.7. Note that we do not have infrastructure 
spending in the model so that the fiscal responses here are assumed to be spending on 
goods and services and not government investment in physical capital. Expenditure on 
infrastructure would likely also stimulate medium to long run supply in the model and 
therefore change the extent to which there is crowding out over time. However to the 
extent that even infrastructure spending is a demand stimulus for the first few year 
before the projects begin to deliver medium run supply responses, the initial results in 
this study can be used to understand the short run impacts of the packages.  
 
Effects of the fiscal stimulus alone 
To see the mechanisms at work, the effects of the fiscal stimulus alone are shown in 
chart set 5.1. These results should be added to the financial crisis results to get a picture 
of the financial crisis with fiscal response. In discussing these results we will talk about 
them relative to baseline which can also be interpreted as relative to what would be seen 
post crisis. It is important to stress that the scenario assumes a reasonably responsive 
financial sector response to the policy packages. As discussed below other scenarios are 
possible. 
The fiscal stimulus gives a boost to real GDP above baseline for all major economies 
and China in 2009, the first year of the fiscal packages. The effects are illustrated by 
referring to China. China’s real GDP could be 1.6 per cent above what otherwise would 
be the case in 2009, but little different from baseline in 2010. Real GDP would be below 
baseline in 2011 in China as the effects of higher real interest rates kick in. Real interest 
rates could be over 3 percentage points above baseline in 2009 and 2010 (see appendix 
charts) offsetting much of the decline in real interest rates from the global financial 
shock and monetary policy responses. Real private investment is 9 per cent below 
baseline in 2010.  Considering the massive 11.4 per cent cumulative fiscal stimulus in 
China, the effect of the fiscal stimulus alone is quite small and transitory.  
Note that the fiscal stimulus in the first year raises GDP but for all countries this effect 
only lasts for a year and is much smaller than many commentators assume (the fiscal 
multiplier is less than one).  Indeed when added to the results for the full GFC 
simulation this fiscal stimulus is not sufficient to completely neutralize the impact of the 
crisis on GDP. The main reason involves the real interest rate implications of the fiscal 
stimulus as shown in Appendix chart C.6. The global nature of the stimulus implies an    31
 
increase in real interest rates which partly offset the spike down in the first year of the 
shocks. Note however that higher real interest rates persist for up to 6 years after the 
stimulus. This result points to some serious potential problems to be faced by 
policymakers during the recovery period from 2010 onwards.  
It should be stressed that there might be some delay in the responsiveness of real 
interest rates in practice, relative to the assumptions in the model. To the extent that 
central banks hold policy rates at very low levels for a long period because banking 
systems do not function in a way assumed in the model, there is likely to be less upward 
pressure of real interest rates and very different story could emerge to the scenario 
modelled here21. With a totally unresponsive private sector it is possible that the fiscal 
package might displace private spending in a worst cases scenario with no change in 
real interest rates. In this case the fiscal spending multiplier may be higher because of a 
lack of crowding out or it might be lower because the private sector is dormant. Neither 
case can be completely ruled out.   
However if the major economies respond as modelled in this paper, the fiscal packages 
also have significant impacts on global trade. In the model the effect of fiscal policy on 
trade comes in a number of forms operating both through income and relative price 
effects. If an economy increased government spending, private consumption tends to 
rise and short term income increases. However the increased borrowing tends to 
increase real interest rates, which reduces private investment22.  These two responses 
have opposite effects on trade. In particular, durable good consumption falls because of 
the rise in real interest rates, while non-durable good consumption rises due to the 
income increase. The effect is that imports of durable goods fall and non-durables rise. 
In addition the higher real interest rate tends to attract foreign capital, which appreciates 
the real exchange rate and tends to crowd out exports and stimulates income through 
relative price changes. A country acting alone has a substantial change in the mix of the 
components of final demand and the real exchange rate dampening on trade tends to 
dominate the income effect on trade. If there is a global fiscal stimulus, the real 
exchange rate (or relative price) effects are muted but still present to the extent that the 
fiscal packages are not symmetric across countries. However, because all countries are 
acting, the real interest rate effects are accentuated because the call on global savings is 
much larger than the outcome of any one country acting alone.  
Chart set 5.1 shows an interesting story where exports of the industrial economies tend 
to fall as a result of the fiscal package. This occurs for several reasons. Firstly, because 
the OECD economies have relatively larger fiscal packages (apart from China), their 
real exchange rate will tend to appreciate relative to the non- OECD economies, 
crowding out exports. Secondly, these economies tend to export more durable goods 
                                                      
 
21 This argument that monetary authorities may not raise interest rates is made in Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Rebelo S. (2009) 
22 to the extent that there is a substantial supply response through infrastructure, the need for 
interest rates to rise for a given constrained capacity would be reduced.    32
 
whose demand is reduced by a rise in global interest rates. This effect was also present 
in the global financial crisis simulation where the risk adjusted discount rise rose 
sharply (even though real interest rates fell) and the demand for durable goods 
collapsed. Global trade (see chart 5.6) does not contract in 2009 but falls for several 
years as growth slows after the fiscal stimulus. By 2014 world trade is above baseline. 
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The unfortunate tendency to trade protection was noted earlier. So far there has not been 
an all-out trade war, possibly due to the hard lessons learned during the Great 
Depression when such a trade war did break out with disastrous consequences. While 
industrial economies are in theory able to applied tariff rates up to bound tariffs, as they 
are legally entitled to do under WTO rules, it is possible to go further by invoking 
special circumstances and by creating no tariff impediments to trade.  
To try and capture a plausible change in protection, the actual shock assumed is a rise in 
all tariff rates by 10 percentage points (i.e. if a tariff was 5% it becomes 15%).  The 
impacts on real GDP from countries increasing tariff rates are shown in Chart set 5.3. 
The overall impacts on global trade are shown in Chart 5.5. 
The rise in tariffs by 10 percentage points has a significant negative impact on GDP. 
The decline in real GDP relative to baseline varies in 2009 between 1.4 percent for the 
United States and United Kingdom to 4.0 percent for Germany. The outcomes reflect 
the relative openness of the economies and the trade linkages between economies. 
Overall the effects of a rise in tariffs by 10 percentage points, is to reduce trade by 
nearly 17% by 2012 (see Chart 5.5). 
As tariffs rise, the input costs of industries increase which tends to raise costs and 
reduce demand in the economy. The rise in relative prices of imports also causes import 
demand to fall which reduces incomes of the exporting countries. This contraction in 
global trade and contraction in global incomes is self reinforcing and hence the world 
economy contracts.  There is a reallocation of global capital away from sectors in which 
tariffs have risen because the return to capital in those sectors is expected to fall because 
demand for those goods that have become more expensive is expected to fall. There is 
also a rise in the imported price of capital goods which are traded and therefore the 
physical amount of capital created from a constant expenditure on investment is less in 
all economies. This further contracts potential output. 
Table 5.4 decomposes the effects of a change in global tariffs into the effects from the 
change in tariffs from each country or region listed across the columns on each country. 
Thus in 2011 the tariff scenario reduces US GDP by 1.28 percent below baseline. The 
impact of the US tariff increase alone on the United States is 0.28 percent in 2011. The 
US tariff reduces Canadian GDP by 1.76 percent in 2011 which is the major part of the 
total loss to Canada of 2.2 percent of GDP. Most countries are too small to gain from a 
rise in tariffs although several regions do initially experience a small rise in GDP from    34
 
their own tariff increased but a fall in GDP on balance when the whole world raises 
tariffs.  
For many countries the effect of a tariff increase alone is to reduce its own GDP. Acting 
together reduces GDP even more. The favourable demand side impact of diverting 
demand from imports to domestic goods is found to be outweighed by the increase in 
the costs of production. This is a very important result from this paper. Tariff increases 
are not just beggar-thy-neighbour policies but are beggar- thy-self. The reason is 
because the usual expenditure switching benefits of a rise in tariffs by a country is more 
than offset by a fall in investment due to rise in the price in imported capital goods and a 
fall in the return to capital in sectors where protection rises. These two supply 
contracting effect dominate any demand stimulus in the model. Most simple analytical 
models take aggregate supply as given and therefore the demand switching issue 
dominates. The supply impact of tariff changes found in the current model is supported 
by the experience of several decades of substantial expansion in output from countries 
that unilaterally liberalized trade. In a model with endogenous capital accumulation and 
international trade in durable capital goods aggregate output is not fixed either 
nationally or globally. 
    35
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations   36
 
5.4: GDP consequences of Tariff Changes by 2011 – percent deviation from baseline 
 
    Source  of  Tariff  Change      
 Global  USA  Japan Europe 
1 OOECD
2 China  India  EEFSU ODCs
3 
United States  -1.28 -0.28 -0.05 -0.25 -0.33 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.33
Japan  -1.69 -0.36 -0.65 -0.15 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.02 -0.41
United Kingdom  -2.12 -0.25 -0.02 -1.48 -0.18 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09
Germany  -3.80 -0.33 -0.04 -2.64 -0.26 -0.04 -0.01 -0.39 -0.08
Euro Area  -2.93 -0.30 -0.05 -1.84 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 -0.24 -0.26
Canada  -2.20 -1.76 -0.04 -0.27 -0.21 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.08
Australia  -1.36 -0.34 -0.15 -0.32 -0.17 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.30
ROECD  -3.74 -0.37 -0.06 -1.74 -1.21 -0.03 -0.01 -0.19 -0.11
China  -4.26 -0.93 -0.29 -0.29 0.05 -1.12 -0.01 -0.09 -1.58
India  -1.55 -0.20 -0.03 -0.22 0.01 -0.03 -0.61 0.01 -0.47
Other Asia  -3.86 -0.98 -0.18 -0.32 -0.03 -0.42 -0.02 -0.02 -1.88
Latin America  -1.63 -1.32 -0.03 -0.26 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06
Other LDC  -1.43 -0.54 -0.02 -0.60 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.15 -0.09
EEFSU  -3.54 -0.61 -0.05 -2.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.62 -0.08
OPEC  -4.45 -0.90 -0.37 -1.00 -0.20 -0.16 -0.06 -0.12 -1.63
Notes: Source G-Cubed Model;   
1. Europe is UK, Germany & Euro Area;  
2.OOECD is Canada, Australia and ROECD;  
3. ODCs is Other Asia, Latin America, Other LDC and OPEC   37
 
5.5  Impact of the GFC, Fiscal Response and Trade War on Global Trade 
























GFC Fiscal Trade War
Data source: G-Cubed model simulations 
 
 
6. Insights gained 
To represent the effects of the financial crisis on the world economy and trade flows, six 
elements are needed. For the crisis itself three shocks are needed to capture the observed 
drop in asset prices and reduction in demand and trade. It is necessary to simulate the 
bursting of the housing bubble centred in the United States and Europe, but extending 
elsewhere, rising perceptions of risk by business as reflected in the equity risk premium 
over bonds and rising perceptions of risk by households.  
The policy response has been dramatic. So the analysis has included a monetary easing 
across the globe and a fiscal stimulus of varying proportions across countries and 
regions. Also, some trade protectionism has emerged, so far in terms of some tariff 
increases, some support for industry, such as automobile manufacturers and other 
effects such as “Buy Local” programs and directives. So a third policy response has 
been included in the analysis, namely a rise in protectionism. There has also been a rise 
in financial protectionism, such as directives to banks to lend locally, but absent any 
estimate of how big this effect is, has not been formally included in this analysis. But 
financial protection affects capital flows and so would affect trade flows.    38
 
Simulating the effect of the crisis itself (that is ignoring the policy responses not already 
built into the model such as endogenous monetary policy rule) on the United States 
alone (the ‘epicentre’ of the crisis) shows several things. Had there not been the 
contagion across other countries in terms of risk reappraisal, the effects would not have 
been as dramatic. The adverse trade effects from the United States downturn would 
have been offset to some degree by positive effects from a global reallocation of capital. 
Were the US alone affected by the crisis, Chinese investment could have actually risen. 
The world could have escaped recession. When there is a reappraisal of risk everywhere 
including China, investment falls sharply – in a sense there is nowhere for the capital to 
go in a global crisis of confidence. The implication is that if markets, forecasters and 
policy makers misunderstand the effects of the crisis and mechanisms at work, they can 
inadvertently fuel fears of a ‘meltdown’ and make matters far worse. 
When there is a global reappraisal of risk there is a large contraction in output and trade. 
The bursting of the housing bubble has a bigger effect on falling consumption and 
imports than does the reappraisal of risk, but the reappraisal of risk has the biggest 
effect on investment. Rising risk causes several effects. The cost of capital is now 
higher and leads to a contraction in the desired capital stock. Hence there is 
disinvestment by business and this can go on for several years – a deleveraging in the 
popular business media. The higher perception of risk by households causes them to 
discount future labor incomes and leads to higher savings and less consumption, 
fuelling the disinvestment process by business. 
The fiscal policy response initially has the desired effect of increasing domestic demand 
and hence real GDP. While the boost to domestic demand on its own boosts trade there 
are other effects going on that have an adverse effect on trade. The fiscal stimulus and 
accompanying borrowing, causes real interest rates to rise over what they would 
otherwise be.  This effect would be diluted if the global economy remained in recession 
for a long period. However, the natural recovery from the shocks as shown in the results 
implies that there will be competition by government and the private sector over scarce 
funds for either private investment or to finance fiscal deficits. The rise in real interest 
rates (relative to what they would have been) and fall in investment and durable good 
demand implies that exports fall and do not get back to baseline for several years. For 
the United States this is takes until 2013 and exports are 6 percent below baseline in 
2010. The fiscal stimulus does not apparently help trade largely because of the impact 
of higher real interest rates on durable goods demand and investment. 
So far, cases of rising trade protection have been sporadic as mostly governments have 
resisted protection to bow to political pressure and protect narrow vested interests. 
Policy makers are right to be worried about trade protection as a resort to widespread 
protection would make matters much worse. For example, if countries raises tariffs by 
10 percentage points, additional falls of real GDP of between 1 and 4.5 percent below 
baseline could occur and exports could variously fall by between 5 and 20 percent 
below baseline for major economies.  One of the conclusions of this study is that the 
crisis and trade protection, all work to discourage exports. The asymmetric fiscal 
expansions redistribute global trade initially with a small impact overall but have a    39
 
medium term negative impact on world trade after the first year as the aftermath of the 
fiscal responses crowd out global demand and slow the recovery. 
The need to avoid a rise in protection as a response to the crisis is a key result of this 
paper. Because the model used has endogenous capital accumulation and trade in capital 
goods, a rise in tariffs by one country reduces that country’s GDP as well as reducing 
GDP in other economies. A global tariff war accentuates the losses. Although it is 
tempting for countries to raise tariffs as a way to switch expenditure from foreign to 
domestic goods to support domestic demand, this paper finds that the negative supply 
consequences on investment and more expensive imported durable goods far outweighs 
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A. Sectoral growth rates underlying the baseline 
Following the approach in McKibbin, Pearce and Stegman (2007), the energy sector in 
the US is assumed to have a rate of productivity growth of 0.1 percent over the next 
century. Each non-energy sector has an initial productivity growth rate close to 
historical experience but gradually converging to 1.8 percent per year in the long run. 
We then assume that each equivalent sector in each other country will catch up to the 
US sector in terms of productivity, closing the gap by 2 percent per year except for the 
developing country region which is assumed to close the gap by 1 percent per year. The 
initial gaps are therefore critical for the subsequent sectoral productivity growth rate. 
We follow a two step process in determining the initial size of the gap. The first step is 
to specify the gap between all sectors and the US sectors equal to the gap between 
aggregate PPP GDP per capita between each country and the US. We cannot easily use 
sectoral PPP gap measures because these are difficult to get in a consistent manner and 
with a wide enough coverage for our purposes. Thus the initial benchmark is based on 
the same gap for each sector as the initial gap for the economy as a whole. If we then 
have evidence that a particular sector is likely to be closer to or further away from the 
US sectors than the aggregate numbers suggest, we adjust the initial sectoral gaps 
attempting to keep the aggregate gaps consistent with the GDP per capita gaps. We then 
assume that productivity growth in each sector closes the gap between that sector and 
the equivalent US sector by 2 percent per year. The productivity growth is calculated 
exogenously to the model. We then overlay this productivity growth model with 
exogenous assumptions about population growth for each country to generate two of the 
main sources of economic growth. 
Given these exogenous inputs for sectoral productivity growth and population growth, 
we then solve the model with the other drivers of growth, capital accumulation, sectoral 
demand for other inputs of energy and materials, all endogenously determined. Critical 
to the nature and scale of growth across countries are these assumptions plus the 
underlying assumptions that financial capital flows to where the return is highest, 
physical capital is sector specific in the short run, labor can flow freely across sectors 
within a country but not between countries and that international trade in goods and 
financial capital is possible subject to existing tax structures and trade restrictions. 
Thus the economic growth of any particular country is not completely determined by 
the exogenous inputs in that country since all countries are linked through goods and 
asset markets.   
In the analysis in this paper we start with a projection of the model from 2007 assuming 
no shocks to relative prices apart from those built into the productivity projections. We 
then imposed each shock on this baseline to generate results as deviation from the 
baseline. While the emergence of major developing countries is already partly built into 
the baseline, we focus on the marginal changes as specified in the scenarios described in 
the body text.44 
Appendx B.  Classification of fiscal measures for 2009–10a 
 Fiscal  packageb 
Rescue package 
as a percentage 
of GDP
I. Public spending on 
goods and services 
II. Fiscal stimulus 
aimed at customers 
III. Fiscal stimulus  
aimed at firms 
 US$b  %
Australiac  22.0  1.8 Funding for schools and 
hospitals; transportation 
projects (railway and 
highway) 
Help to 4 million 
pensioners, carers and 
seniors; carer 
allowance; support 
for low and middle 
incme families; help 
to first time home 
buyers -- total 
spending in this 






Brazil  3.6  0.2 Extension of Bolsa 
(CCT program) to 
include 5 million 
more citizens; 
increase in minimum 
wage by 12% as of 1 
February; tax cuts on 
consumer loans and 
personal income to 
boost car sales 
Tax cuts to help auto 
manufacturers 
China 586.0  6.9 Speeding up rural 
infrastructure construction; 
accelerating the expansion 
of railways; airport 
construction in Western 
province; upgrading power 
grids; greater spending on 
health and education in 
rural areas; enhancing the 
construction of sewage 
and waste treatment 
facilities (total spending in 
this category is 
approximately 3 trillion 
RMB) 
Low rent housing 
(0.28 trillion RMB); 
raising minimum 
grain purchases and 
farm subsidies; 
subsidies for low 
income urban 
residents; increasing 
the number of 
pension funds 






tech and service 
industries; remove loan 
quotas on commercial 
lenders 
Continued on next page 45 
B.2 Classification  of  fiscal  measuresa  (Continued) 
 Fiscal  packageb 
Rescue package 
as a percentage 
of GDP
I. Public spending on 
goods and services 
II. Fiscal stimulus 
aimed at customers 
III. Fiscal stimulus  
aimed at firms 
 US$b  %
France  33.0  1.3 Increasing investments in 
infrastructure projects 
€200 payment for 3.8 
million impoverished 
households 
Protection for the auto 
sector; support for 
business; investing in 
housing and 
construction; social tax 
exemption for 
employers (with less 
than ten workers) who 
have new employees in 
2009 
Germanyd  103.3  1.6 Infrastructure investment 
(schools and roads) worth 
€18 billion 
Income tax cuts (€9 
billion); reduction in 
health insurance 
contributions (€9 
billion taking into 
account employers as 
well); €2,500 
payment for drivers 
who buy a low 
emission car; €100 
cheques per child 
Reduction in health 
insurance contributions 
Italy  6.3  0.3 Stepped up public works 
spending 
€2.4 billion cash 






Japan  110.0  2.3 Funds to local 
governments to invest in 
infrastructure projects; 
accelerated introduction of 
energy saving 
technologies; tax 
incentives for energy 
saving technologies 





regardless of income 
Increased wage 
subsidies for SME 
employers; subsidise 
employers who hire 
temporary workers as 
regular employees; 
inject funds into 
domestic banks to 
support small and 
medium sized 
businesses 
Russia  20.0  1.1 Tax cuts Tax cuts
Continued on next page 46 
B.2 Classification  of  fiscal  measuresa  (Continued) 
 Fiscal  packageb 
Rescue package 
as a percentage 
of GDP
I. Public spending on 
goods and services 
II. Fiscal stimulus 
aimed at customers 
III. Fiscal stimulus  
aimed at firms 
 US$b  %
Spain  113.4  8.1 New public work projects; 
creation of Fund for Local 
Entities and the Special 
Fund for Employment and 
Economic Reactivation 
Tax support measures 
for families; increase 
in social welfare; 
delay in mortgage 
payments for families 
with unemployed 
breadwinners 
Tax cuts; increased 
access to credit for 
SMEs 
United Kingdom  36.4  0.9 Infrastructure spending 
(£3 million) 
VAT reduction from 
17.5 to 15 per cent 
(£12.5 billion); 
permanent increase in 
personal income tax 
allowance for basic 
rate taxpayers (£3.19 
billion) 
Subsidies for employers 
(up to £2,500) who hire 
workers that have been 
unemployed for more 
than six months; other 
employment measures 
(£1.3 billion) 
United States 787.0 5.5 Infrastructure spending; 
production of energy from 
renewable resources; aid 
to science facilities and 
research; broadband 
service in rural areas; aid 
to school districts and 
public colleges; additional 
aid to schools serving low 
income areas; increase in 
the side of Pell grants 
(education grants) 
Tax relief for low 
wage and middle 
income workers of 
roughly US$300 
billion; extended 
jobless benefits and 
retraining; health 
coverage for the 
unemployed; 
temporary increase in 
food stamps 
Help to car makers and 
other distressed sectors 
in need of credit 
Rest of world  149.2  
Total  1958.2  
World GDP in 2008  62 054.1       
Total fiscal package 
as a percentage of 
world GDP 
 3.16      
a Announced measures by each country. The time period of spending is not clear for most countries. b GDP in 2008, IMF. c Australia works on a fiscal year basis 2009-10. d The 
timeframe is two years, hence the package was divided by two. 
Source: ILS, based on Bloomberg, CNBC and national newspapers. 
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C. Detailed results 























































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       48 
 
 
C.2 Trade balance effects of GFC 



















































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       49 
 
 
C.3 Real interest rate effects of GFC 
 
Data source: G-Cubed model simulations 
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C.4 Real effective exchange rate effects of GFC 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       52 
 
 
C.6 Real interest rate effects of fiscal response 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       53 
 
 
C.7 Trade balance effects of fiscal response 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       54 
 
 
C.8 Real effective exchange rate effects of fiscal response 































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       55 
 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       56 
 
 
C.10 Trade balance effects of tariff rise 












































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       57 
 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       58 
 
 
C.12 Real interest rate effects of tariff rise 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       59 
 
 
C.13 Real effective exchange rate effects of tariff rise 




















































































































































































































































































































































Data source: G-Cubed model simulations       60 
 
 
C14 Additional Variables for GFC 
 
(% deviation from baseline) Gross Domestic Prod Total Employment
2009 2010 2009 2010
United States -3.51 -3.24 -7.19 -5.64
Japan -1.63 -1.36 -3.59 -1.56
United Kingdom -4.02 -3.35 -7.72 -5.41
Germany -3.71 -2.96 -7.92 -4.16
Euro Area -3.35 -3.05 -7.20 -5.17
Canada -2.17 -1.94 -5.23 -3.64
Australia -0.67 -0.82 -3.70 -2.57
ROECD -2.87 -2.62 -5.67 -3.67
China -4.39 -3.50 -9.63 -5.33
India -1.06 -0.87 -4.64 -2.29
Other Asia -1.29 -1.22 -5.84 -3.02
Latin America 0.27 -0.34 -2.86 -2.15
Other LDC 1.36 0.36 -0.64 -1.21
EEFSU -1.75 -1.31 -6.69 -3.20
OPEC -3.57 -2.37 -11.47 -3.75         61 
 
 
C15: Additional Sectors Variables 
Outut Prices 
(% deviation from baseline) Energy Mining Agriculture Durable Manufacture Non-Durable Man Services
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
United States -8.80 -5.30 -8.99 -6.66 -6.51 -4.28 -10.05 -7.46 -5.98 -3.57 -6.45 -3.42
Japan -3.95 -2.86 -4.49 -3.71 -2.28 -2.71 -5.45 -4.28 -2.42 -2.68 -3.26 -3.14
United Kingdom -9.66 -6.20 -9.39 -6.79 -5.63 -4.15 -9.38 -7.15 -6.19 -4.25 -7.14 -4.29
Germany -7.85 -6.33 -7.51 -6.48 -5.79 -5.89 -7.06 -6.83 -6.34 -5.81 -10.97 -7.48
Euro Area -8.31 -5.52 -7.18 -5.67 -5.38 -4.06 -9.12 -7.26 -6.19 -4.39 -10.02 -6.20
Canada -5.16 -2.52 -6.58 -4.45 -3.38 -2.37 -7.18 -5.52 -3.32 -2.07 -3.92 -2.23
Australia -7.28 -3.72 -7.87 -4.89 -3.20 -1.18 -7.62 -5.05 -3.78 -1.48 -3.55 -0.98
ROECD -7.03 -4.41 -5.84 -4.67 -4.58 -3.62 -6.83 -5.79 -4.07 -3.31 -5.55 -3.96
China -10.05 -8.55 -9.09 -8.90 -4.93 -6.81 -11.50 -10.07 -6.70 -7.22 -9.93 -8.69
India -6.68 -4.05 -8.13 -5.88 -3.39 -2.13 -9.06 -6.08 -4.89 -3.08 -6.66 -3.59
Other Asia -10.45 -7.47 -10.29 -8.26 -5.69 -5.39 -11.77 -9.24 -7.06 -5.93 -8.28 -6.20
Latin America -6.85 -4.27 -8.51 -6.10 -4.15 -2.86 -10.48 -7.65 -4.58 -3.06 -4.15 -2.61
Other LDC -7.50 -4.29 -6.76 -4.06 -1.33 0.10 -6.99 -4.58 -3.46 -1.56 -2.13 -0.54
EEFSU -9.36 -7.21 -9.28 -7.67 -6.54 -6.18 -9.77 -7.98 -7.45 -6.48 -8.33 -6.54
OPEC -14.34 -10.59 -14.73 -12.20 -10.05 -11.16 -17.53 -13.31 -12.73 -11.00 -17.69 -12.53
Production
(% deviation from baseline) Energy Mining Agriculture Durable Manufacture Non-Durable Man Services
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
United States -3.25 -3.01 -10.95 -11.16 -6.01 -5.63 -11.74 -12.66 -3.99 -2.74 -3.85 -3.10
Japan -1.42 -0.65 -5.27 -3.30 -2.33 -1.09 -6.11 -4.56 -2.03 -0.68 -2.16 -1.17
United Kingdom -4.25 -3.32 -12.12 -12.24 -6.79 -4.99 -12.40 -12.03 -5.21 -3.10 -4.63 -3.34
Germany -3.46 -1.65 -5.86 -5.19 -5.63 -3.01 -9.85 -8.12 -3.90 -1.59 -2.75 -1.92
Euro Area -2.51 -1.97 -5.60 -5.65 -4.86 -3.24 -8.69 -9.53 -4.27 -2.61 -3.28 -2.69
Canada -1.40 -0.98 -8.16 -8.68 -3.71 -3.06 -9.59 -10.21 -2.68 -1.60 -2.88 -1.89
Australia -1.98 -2.34 -5.60 -6.35 -1.66 -1.17 -5.78 -7.23 -1.27 -0.23 -1.54 -0.82
ROECD -2.10 -1.43 -5.58 -4.95 -3.62 -2.30 -9.04 -8.75 -3.74 -1.79 -3.34 -2.18
China -2.79 -1.85 -7.88 -6.45 -3.73 -2.21 -7.90 -6.85 -4.09 -1.98 -4.36 -3.05
India -1.48 -1.28 -4.89 -5.02 -1.33 -0.32 -3.58 -4.16 -2.36 -1.26 -1.82 -1.35
Other Asia -1.59 -1.30 -4.84 -4.36 -2.07 -1.00 -6.56 -6.21 -2.44 -1.09 -2.52 -1.55
Latin America -1.86 -1.74 -7.16 -6.91 -2.03 -1.82 -4.71 -5.60 -0.42 -0.49 -0.80 -0.88
Other LDC -1.95 -2.43 -2.76 -3.61 2.09 1.09 -1.36 -3.02 0.58 -0.02 0.53 -0.08
EEFSU -2.87 -1.77 -6.28 -4.91 -2.37 -1.33 -6.85 -5.58 -2.47 -1.17 -2.25 -1.29
OPEC -1.08 0.20 -7.20 -3.50 -9.54 -3.82 -8.03 -5.38 -7.59 -2.72 -4.53 -2.23 